“What is urgently needed now is that UNSMIL stops wasting any more time on curtsy visits and meetings in Libya and abroad and, instead, focuses on implementing the roadmap without delay.”
The Tripoli Post
Tripoli— The Libyan Association of Judicial Bodies (LAJB) has demanded in a statement on 18 September that PM Abdulhamid Dbeibeh recant a decision whereby a committee was formed to hand over the sensitive Mitiga prison and the Ain Zara prison to the Ministry of Justice could lead to more tensions in the capital Tripoli and undermine the fragile truce that has been agreed upon recently.
The decision stipulated the formation of a committee headed by a senior official from the Office of the Attorney General and included representatives from the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Police. The committee was tasked to use “necessary measures” to take over the two prisons, count the inmates, classify them according to the cases against them and submit the prisons to the Ministry of Justice.
Both prisons have been under the control of the Special Deterrence Force (SDF), known as Rada, for more than a decade. The said committee will also monitor compliance with law enforcement regarding those wanted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in cooperation with relevant authorities.
The LAJB’s statement underlines the fragility surrounding such agreement which has been described by some observers as being not transparent, not officially adopted nor announced by the parties involved, and that its terms and implementation mechanisms have not been clarified.
According to LAJB, the formation of a committee to deal with the prisons may compromise the principle of separation of powers or violate the independence of the judiciary. “The Public Prosecution is an integral part of the judiciary, subject to the leadership of the Public Prosecutor and operating under his direct supervision,” it said.
The LAJB stressed, “assigning a member of the Public Prosecution to head an executive committee by decision issued by the executive authority, without the nomination or explicit approval of the Public Prosecutor or the Supreme Judicial Council, constitutes a clear violation of the principle of judicial independence and an unacceptable encroachment on legal powers.”
The statement adds fire, albeit indirectly, to those elements, on both sides of the conflict, local and foreign, who are skeptical about the 13th September agreement between the SDF and the Government of National Unity (GNU), and would rather not see a cessation of tension and stability in Tripoli and the whole of Libya as well.
Upon his arrival from a visit abroad, the head of the Presidential Council (PC) Mohamed Al-Menfi held a meeting, also on Wednesday, with the Security and Military Arrangements Committee (SMAC) during which he reviewed the latest developments and the ongoing efforts to consolidate the ceasefire in the capital. The meeting also reviewed the latest two decisions made by PM Dbeibeh relating to the two prisons and the one aimed to separate between the Mitiga International Airport from the Mitiga military air base.
Al-Menfi’s media office said “the meeting also addressed steps to implement security agreements to enhance stability in the country,” without providing further details; and stressed that the Presidential Council, as a whole, is the Supreme Commander of the Army. There have been no reports of any one-on-one meeting meeting between Mr. Al-Menfi and Mr. Dbeibeh relating to the implementation of the truce agreement.
The SMAC was established on June 4 by a decision made by Mr. Al-Menfi in coordination and consultations with the GNU, local Tripoli and western Libya’s leaders, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as well as unspecified number of foreign ambassadors to Libya. This committee undertook the responsibility for preparing and implementing a comprehensive plan for security and military arrangements in the capital, Tripoli, ensuring the city is free of all armed presence.
On 13 September, al-Menfi and Dabaiba mediated a security agreement between the SDF, affiliated with the PC, on one hand, and the GNU’s affiliated armed groups as well as the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, on the other, whereby a number of steps to be made by both with the aim of de-escalate tension between the DSF and the GNU.
Speaking to al-Wasat TV, Al-Menfi’s advisor, Ziyad Daghaim, said that the first step was taken by the DSF which demonstrated “a great deal of responsibility and cooperation.” He noted that the implementation of the agreement is based on the principle of “step by step.”
He explained that “the agreement sets a timetable, as well as a procedural one. Some things are tied to a specific timeframe, and others are tied to specific procedures, such as issuing a decree or decision or forming a committee. Alternatives were also put in place, as there are very delicate technical points.”
Now, whether the LAJB’s declared position can be seen as an indication that the DSF is having second thoughts about implementing the agreement, especially if it sees that the GNU is exploiting its willingness to compromise is not a farfetched assumption.
Especially if it is seen in the context of Daghaim’s words and in an earlier statement made by the Souq al-Jumaa Movement (Harak Souq al-Jumaa), a suburb of eastern Tripoli and the DSF’s political base. It is also where the DSF is located along with the Mitiga civilian and military airports. Harak Souq al-Jumaa, which can also be seen as a DSF’s political arm, said in a statement on 13 September that it was a party to the agreement, reached under the auspices of the Turkish government, stressing that binds every one and is not limited to the DSF alone.
Nonetheless, the Harak warned that the proposed provisions would only be implemented in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, and that they are “applied to all forces, entities, and concerned parties,” meaning all pro-GNU armed groups that came from outside the capital.
Taking all these and other political, military and tribal elements into consideration, the 13 September agreement remains fragile and concrete steps such as establishing a unified government and holding national elections must be made soon.
A member of the Defense and National Security Committee in the House of Representatives, Rabiaa Bouras, told the Arabi21 website that “the danger still exists, noting that the agreement’s viability remains fragile unless it is supported by genuine implementation and oversight mechanisms, free from politicization and self-interest.” She considered the withdrawal of forces arriving from outside the capital, along with their equipment, to be the greatest challenge facing the Presidential Council.
Bouras added that the agreement spared Tripoli the specter of a new war, but it did not address the roots of the crisis. Rather, it gave the government, the Deterrence Force, and the Presidential Council a temporary political boost, while its popular impact remains limited in light of criticism that sees it as an acknowledgment of a parallel authority from various parties.
As the situation remains tense in Tripoli and the economic crisis and hardships deepen further, a result of divided governmental institutions, it is important that foreign parties, and their local allies who keep on prolonging the crisis, move aside and allow Libyans to own and control the their country’s political process, hence their destiny. As it is now crystal clear to any observer, such political process is far from being Libyan-owned and Libyan-led.
It has been a month since the SRSG and head of UNSMIL Hanna Tetteh presented her political roadmap to the UN Security Council on 21 August with the aim of taking Libya to national elections. This thing has not even started to happen yet. There has since been no real and tangible progress on the ground in this regard. What is urgently needed now is that UNSMIL stops wasting any more time on curtsy visits and meetings in Libya and abroad and, instead, focuses on implementing the roadmap without delay.
At the podium of the UN Security Council, Ms, Tetteh said:
“Mr. President, excellencies,” “The message we clearly received was the desire to stop the cycles of repeated transitional periods; preserve and strengthen the unity of the country and its institutions; as well as to renew their legitimacy through presidential and legislative elections; and end what was frequently referenced as foreign interference. They demand a stronger voice through the political process to secure accountable governance – anchored in a permanent constitution.”